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INTRODUCTION

T

he bicentennial year provoked a reconsideration of not only the era of
the framing but of constitutional history as a whole.1 At one point I
thought that I might participate in that effort by writing a history of the
Supreme Court, updating Robert McCloskey's classic book in light of
recent scholarship. 2 It turned out that that project was too daunting for
me. There was too much material to assimilate before I could feel
comfortable in trying to present or even develop a history of the Supreme
Court. This essay is, therefore, only a sketch of a revisionist history of the
Supreme Court. It is extremely abstract, eliminates a lot of detail and

* Part of this essay was prepared for a roundtable on the historiography ofthe Supreme

Court, at the meeting of the OAH, April 4, 1987, in Philadelphia. Additionally, the text of
this Article, with minor changes, was presented as the Thirty-Ninth Cleveland-Marshall
Fund Lecture, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, April 9, 1987.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B., Harvard College; M.A.,
Yale University; J.D., Yale Law School.
' For recent one-volume histories of constitutional law, see M. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF
LIBERTY:

A

CONSTrUIYONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

(1988); W.

WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW:

THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIF (1988).
2 R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
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qualifications, and avoids dealing with problems and materials that do
not fit the basic pattern I will identify. I must add that the pattern needs
so much more elaboration and qualification that I am not entirely
comfortable in presenting it in even this sketchy form.
II.

HISTORIES OF THE SUPREME COURT

To explain what a revisionist history of the Supreme Court would be
like, and therefore, to explain what my project would be, I must describe
what it is revising. It may be useful to begin by examining two
programmatic statements about constitutional history. Twenty-five years
ago Paul Murphy published Time to Reclaim: The CurrentChallenge of
American ConstitutionalHistory.3 In it he decried the historical profession's neglect of constitutional history, which he found particularly
serious because some members of the Supreme Court were then, as they
are now, relying on history (bad history, to be sure) to justify their
opinions. 4 Murphy argued that this jurisprudence provided historians
a coordinate role through the furnishing of
with "the opportunity to play
'5
new historical materials."
Since the publication of Murphy's article, the so-called jurisprudence of
original intent has become perhaps more prominent. Many have criticized it as a jurisprudence, 6 and others have criticized its proponents for
relying on bad history.7 As Murphy noted, much of the history on which
these proponents rely has not been produced by trained historians.8 For
example, Justice Rehnquist's originalist opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree,9
the moment-of-silence case, relied on the analysis developed by political
scientists Robert Cord and Michael Malbin.10 It may be worth explaining
briefly why trained historians have not played the role that Murphy
foresaw-or at least hoped they would play.
Recent controversies about original intent have focused on the fourteenth amendment in general,1 1 the application to the states of the

69 AM. HIsT. REV. 64 (1963).
4 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5 Murphy, supra note 3, at 78-79.
6 See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
7 See, e.g., Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54

N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979).
Murphy, supra note 3, at 77.
9 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10 See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
M. MALBiN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF

See also R. MORGAN,
11 See R. BERGER,
(1970).

THE

FACT ANDCURRENT FICTION

(1982);

AuTHORs OF THE FtiST AMENDMENT (1978).

DISABUNG AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME 22-32 (1984).
GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
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provisions of the Bill of Rights in particular,12 and the topic I will address,
the establishment clause of the first amendment. Cord and Malbin
developed an earlier, minority view of the establishment clause, according to which Congress, acting pursuant to any of its enumerated powers,
could provide what has variously been called nondiscriminatory or
nonpreferential aid, or aid to religion in general. Recent works by
Leonard Levy and Thomas Curry show why historians probably cannot
play the role Murphy described, even if, like13Levy and Curry, they intend
to participate in the originalist discussion.
Historians face two difficulties that lawyers and political scientists can
overlook. For inquiries into original intent to be useful in constitutional
law, they have to yield relatively firm answers: Judges want to be able to
say, "The framers meant thus-and-so." But the training and disciplinary
orientation of historians leads them to be attuned to the complexities of
any real historical event or set of intentions 14 which makes their
conclusions less useful to judgesi1
Second, and perhaps more important, historians are trained to be
acutely sensitive to the broader context of events and intentions. Particularly important to my point here are the lessons historians have learned
about intellectual history from Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock. One
context of constitutional language is the general rhetoric of political
discourse. Skinner and Pocock have shown that we cannot reconstruct the
meaning of terms like "establishment of religion" without also reconstructing the entire intellectual universe in which those terms were set.
Perhaps the clearest message of Levy's and Curry's books is that the

12

See M.

CURTIS,

(1986).
13 L. LEVY,

No STATE

SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANDTHE BILL OF RIGHTS

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); T. CURRY, THE

FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
Curry's desire to influence current debates is signalled by his self-conscious evocation of the
rhythms of Justice Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), in
his own concluding summary of his investigation: The First Amendment "meant at least
this ..
" T. CURRY, supra, at 222. See also Tushnet, Lawyers' History, Historians' Law:
OriginalIntent, the EstablishmentClause, and Minority Religions in the Era of the Framing
of the Constitution, AM. JEWISH HIST. (forthcoming).
14 See L. LEVY, supra note 13, at xiii.
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE

is One can imagine, though only a few have propounded, a jurisprudence that says that,
unless the original intent to prohibit a practice is clear, it is not prohibited. Few have even
offered this jurisprudence, because it has difficulty handling problems such as are posed by
wiretapping and kindred technological developments. And those who have proposed it
uniformly overlook the problem posed by the fact that the ordinary operations of government have expanded so substantially that it is only fictionally consistent with the
intentions of the framers to allow government to operate on such an expanded scale subject
only to those precise limitations, on a much smaller government, that the framers had in

mind. This is not to say that this jurisprudence cannot be defended; it is just to say that the
defense must go beyond originalism.
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universe of discourse about religion in 1789 is quite unlike the universe
of discourse about religion today. The terms were in flux; concepts of
religious liberty and nonestablishment ran into each other in ways that
are quite difficult to understand today. Most important, in 1789 the
United States was a Christian and a Protestant nation in both a
statistical and an unproblematically normative sense. Today it remains
statistically a Christian nation, but no longer can it be said that the
equivalent normative statement is unproblematic. Further, given the
intensity felt by the framers about denominational differences among
Protestant sects, as Madison called them, it seems unlikely in the
extreme that they would have found the concept of "religion in general"
at all intelligible. This means that the framers' normative understanding
of the religion clauses cannot be translated directly into contemporary
constitutional law without a substantial shift in our current intellectual
universe.16
To summarize, historians make their distinctive contribution to knowledge in this field precisely by distancing us from the framers, showing us
the degree to which their intellectual, and therefore, constitutional world
is different from ours. 17 That may be precisely why historians cannot
assist originalist judges in the way that Murphy suggested.
In 1981, Harry Scheiber discussed "what many practitioners of constitutional history consider to be a genuine crisis in their field"-a crisis
that apparently had persisted despite Murphy's urgings. 18 Like Murphy,
though, Scheiber was optimistic. He argued that the "new" legal history
provided the basis for revitalizing constitutional history. The new legal
history completed the integration of law into the Progressive paradigm
by stressing the "interaction of change in law with socioeconomic
developments," just as Progressive historiography stressed the interaction of politics with those developments.' 9 Scheiber argued that the new
constitutional history would show how judges shaped the law with

16 Proponents of the nonpreferentialist theories frequently augment their arguments by
invoking nonoriginalist ideas, such as that the pluralism of contemporary American
politics, on the issue of religion, makes it unlikely that legislatures will enact statutes that
pose serious threats to religious liberty. Again, these augmented arguments may be
persuasive, but they, too, are no longer originalist, and it is the added material that
contributes the persuasive force.
"7 That is precisely how historians have helped us understand the relation between the
framing of the fourteenth amendment and the antislavery constitutional jurisprudence that
formed its basis. See Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in ConstitutionalLaw: The Equal
ProtectionClause, Dr. DuBois, and CharlesHamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HiST. 884, 885-90
(1987).
" Scheiber, American ConstitutionalHistory and the New Legal History: Complementary Themes in Two Modes, 68 J. AM. HisT. 337 (1981).
'9 Id. at 337.
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"consequences for economic institutions and allocations of income and
20
power."
Scheiber's essay is striking for two reasons. First, the new constitutional history apparently would have little to say about the traditional
topics of constitutional history. It would examine the social, economic,
and political role of the idea of constitutionalism, but not, it seems, the
parallel roles of particular constitutional doctrines. 21 It would examine
the effects of the general structures of constitutional law, of which
Scheiber stressed federalism, but not those of the Supreme Court's
changing formulations of the scope of Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce. Indeed, Scheiber argued that attention to developments at the state level would show how little articulated constitutional
doctrine had to do with the operation and regulation of the economy.
This leads to the second notable point about Scheiber's essay. Contemporaneous with its publication, the Progressive integration of law into
socioeconomic history came under sustained attack, at least with regard
to the usual formulations of the claimed interaction between law and
socioeconomic developments. Under these circumstances, constitutional
historians interested in doctrine might well become cautious about
joining an enterprise under siege.
Scheiber's discussion of states' divergence from stated Supreme Court
law suggests one aspect of the challenge. The litigation process is costly,
and people disadvantaged by legal rules often find it sensible to use their
money in other ways including using it to support their own relocation to
another jurisdiction. They may withdraw from the regulated activity and
invest elsewhere in states more hospitable to their activities; they may
support political rather than judicial efforts to alter the law; or, in some
situations, they can develop alternative contractual arrangements to
22
accomplish their goals without coming under the rules they dislike.
These factors make it quite difficult to persuasively link legal doctrine to
socioeconomic effects, 23 thus supporting Scheiber's implicit argument

20

Id. at 341.

21

To use an example that Scheiber does not mention, one might want to examine the

rhetoric of constitutionalism in social movements.
22

See, e.g., Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95

HARV.

L. REv.

1717 (1982); Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & Soc. REV. 631 (1980-81).
2' For example, it appears to be a staple of Progressive legal history to claim that the
fellow servant rule promoted investment in railroads by shifting the cost of accidents from
the railroads to workers. Among the difficulties with this thesis are: the "rule" was riddled
with so many exceptions, almost from the beginning, that it could not possibly have had
much impact on investment decisions; workers might have extracted higher wages from

employers to compensate for the risk of injury; worker mobility was substantial enough
during this period that it is difficult to see exactly why employers would have been in a
position to resist workers' efforts to contract around the fellow servant rule.
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about looking at structure, but further distancing the history of the
Supreme Court from social, political, and economic history.
In addition, sometimes there appear to be links across doctrinal areas
that are not easily accounted for by direct reference to social, economic, or
political events or trends. Consider some examples: Around the turn of
the century, the Supreme Court developed the rule that Congress could
not directly regulate intrastate commerce, and the rule that states could
not directly regulate interstate commerce. 24 The distinctions between
direct and indirect regulation were so unclear that we cannot even
describe a pattern that links results to politics. Rather, what seems
important is the very concept of directness. The relevant question is not
how was the concept used in the service of political or other ends
identified in Progressive historiography, but rather, why did the idea of
directness have the force that it did in the society as it was then
constituted. This is particularly interesting because the idea lost its force
in the 1920's and 193 0's when it was replaced by balancing tests. One
wants to say that "directness" was an idea congenial to a robust,
relatively laissez faire capitalism, while "balancing" is congenial to
welfare state capitalism. 25 Yet, the resources of Progressive historiography seem ill-suited to justify that conclusion. I will return to this example
in Section II of this essay.
A similar puzzle is posed by the celebrated "footnote 4" analysis by
Harlan Fiske Stone in United States v. CaroleneProducts.26 The analysis
was intended to, and did, justify judicial intervention on behalf of
important elements in the New Deal coalition; this observation is readily
compatible with the Progressive synthesis. But, what are we to make of
the fact that Stone applied the same analysis to questions about the
constitutionality of state regulation of interstate commerce? 27 Of course,
one is entitled to say that the Progressive synthesis explains the
attraction of "footnote 4" analysis in its core applications, and the merits
of the analysis explains its attractions elsewhere. That seems uncomfortably ad hoc. Alternatively, "footnote 4" analysis provided a method by
which the Court could justify its continuing effort to supervise state
economic regulation while simultaneously repudiating the direct supervision it had exercised by means of the due process clause. More
speculatively, one might say that "footnote 4" relies on ideas of "insider
v. outsider" that were somehow compatible with the politics, or more

" See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); DiSanto v. Pennsylvania,

273 U.S. 34 (1927).
25 This question is explored in the celebrated unpublished work of Duncan Kennedy on
classical legal thought.
26 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
27 See, e.g., South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938);

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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likely, the culture of the 1930's and 1940's. Here the Progressive
synthesis seems to work best on the level of particular decisions, but is at
least underdeveloped when we think about larger doctrinal structures.
Finally, contemporary constitutional law has endorsed the relevance of
an intent-based analysis in areas ranging from equal protection to state
regulation of commerce to establishment of religion. 28 The Progressive
synthesis would explain these doctrines as efforts by a conservative
Supreme Court to limit the reach of the Constitution or the courts, in
comparison with the more broad ranging results that would be reached if
an "impact" based test were applied. Here the Progressive synthesis
seems too blunt, missing the nuances. The purportedly conservative
approach has been applied fairly aggressively to overturn state regulations of commerce, which is consistent with one sense of conservatism,
but not with another. Even if the Progressive synthesis says only that the
Court used its analysis to promote the narrowly political goals of
contemporary conservatives, it would fail to grapple with the fact that the
Court did so by using an "intent" test, and would not explain why
conservatism took that particular form. Again, a more fruitful analysis
might examine how notions of individual responsibility, such as are
captured by ideas of intent, fit into a general conservative world view.
With these remarks as background, I turn to an examination of recent
works of constitutional history. These works share several characteristics. First, most histories of constitutional law are just that and are not
histories of the Supreme Court. They deal with many things other than
what the Supreme Court has done. For example, the histories of the
Constitution contain extensive discussions of the development of the
bureaucracy of administrative agencies and of the expanding scope of
presidential power which has occurred essentially without significant
judicial supervision until recently. Indeed, in these histories of the
Constitution the history of the administrative agencies is a long term
development interrupted at random by the Supreme Court. In contrast, a
revisionist history of the Supreme Court would be a history of the
Supreme Court.
A revisionist history of the Supreme Court would deal with what might
be called the institution of the Supreme Court, as one might have a
history of the Congress or the President. For example, it is an important
part of a history of the Supreme Court that in the twentieth century the
Court has become more bureaucratized: there are law clerks when there
were none before, and the office of the Clerk of Court has become a better
supervisor of the flow of paper in the Supreme Court.

2

See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (equal protection); Lynch v.

Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishment clause); Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (dormant commerce clause).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988

7

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:319

For reasons that are not worth going into, I have done a short article on
a change in the Court's behavior that people have not noticed. In the late
1930's and early 1940's the Supreme Court frequently granted rehearings
of cases that it had already decided. This does not happen any more. I
argue that this change is attributable to the increasing bureaucratization
of the Supreme Court as there are now more checks on mistakes. 29 In the
past, rehearings were granted when there was some sort of mistake.
Given the development of more law clerks and the bureaucracy of the
Clerk of the Court, the chance of an error is lower.
In addition, a history of the Supreme Court would be a history of
constitutional doctrine. For example, a history of the Supreme Court
would not talk about how administrative agencies themselves developed
and became an important fourth branch of the government, but would
talk about how the Court rationalized that development in those few
cases that it has decided. In that way, the discussion of the Court's work
would not be intrusive but would rather be the focus of the development.
Before we examine some historians' works, it is worth noting that law
professors continue to produce relatively standard doctrinal histories.
The most dramatic recent work in this genre is, of course, David Currie's
curious effort to grade Supreme Court opinions as if they were answers to
questions he posed on a law school examination.30 Even here the power of
the Progressive synthesis is shown by the fact that when Currie finds it
worthwhile to look outside the cases, he offhandedly invokes political
31
considerations as if their relevance went without argument.
The recent volumes of the Holmes Devise history of the Supreme Court
are not so narrow. The Bickel-Schmidt volume is straight-forwardly
Whiggish in its effort to demonstrate that the White Court was not as bad
as it could have been on issues of race. 32 George Haskins and Herbert
Johnson strive to show that the early Marshall Court succeeded in
separating law from politics, thus conforming to the vision of a law that
needs no explanation from outside itself.33 Their Whiggish intentions are

clear, but their argument can be placed in a broader framework suggested by their own evidence. Haskins and Johnson show, I believe, that

29 Tushnet, Sloppiness in the Supreme Court, O.T. 1935-O.T. 1944, 3 CON. COMM. 73
(1986). See also Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter:An InstitutionalPerspective
on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1985).
30 D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FuRS HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888
(1985).
" Id. at xii, xiii.
32 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME IX: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921 (1984).
See also Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration:The Case
of ProfessorSchmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986).

" G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OP THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME II: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815 (1981).
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the separation of law from politics was a political achievement of the
highest order, preserving from direct political control some rather welldefined interests that were otherwise at serious risk. Seen in this way,
their work both contributes to the Progressive synthesis by offering a
political explanation for constitutional law in the large, and advances the
inquiry, by refraining from such explanations of particular doctrines or
decisions.
These works share one characteristic with historians' surveys. Like the
lawyers, the historians are unable to refrain from evaluating the Court's
work. The grounds for evaluation range from Paul Murphy's civil
libertarianism to Forrest McDonald's idiosyncratic blend of libertarianism and constitutionalism. 34 From my perspective as a constitutional
lawyer, the evaluative emphasis is curious. Murphy rightly criticized
judges for doing amateurish history, but the point applies in reverse as
well. Developing appropriate grounds for evaluating constitutional decisions is quite difficult, and historians are likely to be amateurish at the
task. For example, McDonald summarizes New Deal constitutional
developments by saying that "[t]he only remaining restraints upon
Congress and the President were democracy and bureaucracy-neither of
which is to be found in the Constitution." 35 What "found in the Constitution" means is hardly transparent, and a constitutional lawyer's
confidence is hardly bolstered by McDonald's supporting claims that the
Court in the Jones & Laughlin case "stretched the commerce clause
beyond recognition" as if the prior law had been clear on the issue, and
that Helvering v. Davis,36 rather than United States v. Butler,3 7 first
adopted the Hamiltonian theory that the general welfare clause was a
38
positive grant of power to Congress.
A related, but more subtle, difficulty is suggested by Herman Belz's
statement about the rise of presidential government that "many Americans" found it "at variance with the soundest traditions of the American
constitutional system."39 I will discuss the equivocation implicit in "many
Americans" later. Here what is interesting is Belz's apparent identification of the "soundest" constitutional tradition with a particular distribution of power between President and Congress. That identification takes
a position on a controversial matter of constitutional theory. There is an
alternative view, grounded in Madison's discussion of federalism and the

" F.

McDONALD,

A

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1982).

35 Id. at 199.
36 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
37 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
3" Id. at 198.

" A. KELLY, W. HARBISON,
423 (1983).

& H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONsTrruTIoN: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
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separation of powers in The Federalist.40 Juxtapose "ambition must be
made to counteract ambition" 4 1 with
If... the people should in [the] future become more partial to the
federal than to the State governments, the change can only result
from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will overcome their antecedent propensities. And in that
case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most
42
of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due
and we have a different view: The Constitution does not specify an
allocation of authority, but endorses whatever distribution results from
the competition among the institutions of American government.
It should be clear that I do not want to criticize historians' evaluative
perspectives because they are treading on unfamiliar turf. Of course
anyone can make mistakes, and the ordinary academic division of labor
should suggest nothing more than caution to historians as it should to
academic lawyers. But, why should historians, qua historians, be interested in offering evaluations of the Supreme Court's behavior?43 Haskins
and Johnson's work suggests one answer. Evaluations of constitutional
law are built into the self-understandings of judges and citizens. For
example, to the extent that people believe that it is important to separate
law from politics, the flow of events will be affected by their beliefs about
the extent to which the Court has successfully separated those domains.
Evaluation thus plays an explanatory role, at least to the extent that the
evaluations are those made by historical actors. I find it relatively easy to
read Haskins and Johnson in this way. Similarly, Belz's preface to his
revision of Kelly and Harbison notes that the original version was
"written from the perspective of Progressive historiography and the
liberal nationalist reform tradition." 44 That evaluative tradition was
causally important throughout the late nineteenth century and became
dominant in the twentieth, and so Kelly and Harbison's evaluations
45
pointed to, as they were symptomatic of, important social forces. It is too

early to tell whether the skepticism shared by Belz and McDonald will
have similarly explanatory force. It does seem to me, though, that to the
extent that "the liberal nationalist reform tradition" was an important
social force, evaluations like McDonald's are bound to seem anachronistic
until the account reaches the 1950's or so.
In addition, these evaluative points are ways of identifying what the

40
41
42
41
44
41

Nos. 46 and 51 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, AT295 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Obviously, historians are interested in evaluative questions as citizens.
THE FEDERALIST,
THE FEDERALIST

KELLY, HARBISON, & BELZ, supra note 39, at xiii.
See also P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRisIs TIMES
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justices' own theories of judicial review were. Over the past generation a
pretty good map of possible constitutional theories has developed, and
this map can help us understand how Chief Justice Taney and Justice
Stephen Field approached their jobs. Consider two examples: In Marbury
v. Madison,46 the most important element in Chief Justice Marshall's
justification for judicial review is a theory of the sort we have become
used to. Marshall's theory was closely tied to the text of the Constitution.
At the crucial point in the argument Marshall wrote, "The constitution
declares 'that no bill of attainder ...

shall be passed.' If, however, such a

bill should be passed, and a person should be prosecuted under it; must
the court condemn to death those victims when the constitution endeavors to preserve." 47 That is a classic textualist argument, and it is useful
to have seen in the past generation the development of arguments about
the coherence of textualism to understand exactly what Marshall was
doing. I have already mentioned the second example, Harlan Fiske
Stone's theory that we now know as representation reinforcing review.
There too we see a theoretical perspective being deployed by one of the
Justices, and again I think it useful to have the theoretical discussions of
the past generation to illuminate what was going on. Note, however, that
the theoretical underpinnings I have discussed were held and articulated
by the Justices themselves. It is not clear to me that it would be so
directly useful to evaluate the work of Justices who were not selfconsciously theoretical.
One final point about the evaluative emphasis will assist in making the
transition to my discussion of the next characteristic of constitutional
histories. The level of attention has shifted from outcomes to theory. Yet,
the past generation's discussion of theories like textualism and representation reinforcement has led to conclusions that as theories they give
insufficient guidance to prescribe outcomes in particular cases. 48 We will
ultimately need some account of such outcomes. That returns us to the
Progressive historiographical tradition, which supplies the explanatory
framework for some works, and the vision to which others react. To that
extent, Scheiber's call for the integration of constitutional and socioeconomic history has been heeded. Still, some important problems remain.
For present purposes, it is useful to identify two basic conceptualizations
of the integration that Scheiber envisioned. In one, socio-politicaleconomic events and forces cause constitutional development to take the
course that it does. In the other, the causal arrow runs the other way.
One aspect of the Progressive tradition has parallels to studies of
general politics in the United States. Historians have identified and

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
47 Id. at 179.
48 See generallyM. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE,
46

AND BLUE:
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criticized what they call the presidential synthesis in the writing of the
political history of the United States. There is a similar Chief Justice
synthesis in histories of constitutional law. For example, we talk about
the Marshall Court, the Taney Court, and the Warren Court. In the
Progressive synthesis the names of the Chief Justices operate as surrogates for political orientation. There are several points to make about
this. First, we are comfortable with giving the names of Chief Justices to
these periods when the Chief Justices served long enough. Rather than
speaking of a Stone Court or a Vinson Court, we talk instead about a New
Deal Court or a Roosevelt Court depending on how strongly we want to
emphasize the political element. We do not talk about a White Court and
a Taft Court but a Lochner-eraCourt. This indicates that the name of the
Chief Justice really is just a surrogate for the underlying political
analysis.
Second, the Chief Justice label as surrogate can be misleading. A
contemporary example is that talk about the Warren Court, the Burger
Court, and now the Rehnquist Court is almost certainly wrong. Since the
mid-1950's it has been the Brennan Court. 49 Calling it the Brennan Court
gives a different view of what has been going on in the Supreme Court
than calling it a Warren or Burger-Rehnquist Court.
Another dimension of the inaccuracy may be suggested by the Brennan
Court observation but can be brought out more clearly by referring back
to the Marshall Court and the Taney Court. Doing so inserts a discontinuity that may not be there or may not be as important as the labeling
might suggest. The final section of this essay argues that there are
important elements of continuity during the entire nineteenth century,
which the Chief Justice synthesis obscures.
The primary strength of the Progressive synthesis is its insistence on
connecting the Supreme Court to politics, and it does so in the right way.
By this I mean that the connection is historically accurate and consistent
with the general conception of the role of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional scheme held by the framers' generation. According to that
conception, the Constitution was designed to give the American people
what they wanted, whatever that happened to be, as long as the
American people wanted it over a long enough period. If there was a
sustained consensus, the Constitution was designed to allow that consensus to be achieved. For example, even if the framers would have voted
against particular developments, they believed that if they had been
outvoted over a long enough period the views of the majority ought to
prevail. The best examples of this are the staggered terms at the House

" See B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME CoUir-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
(1983); Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief-Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81 MICH. L. Rev.
922 (1983).
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of Representatives, the Senate, and the Presidency. A coalition can get
what it wants if it holds together long enough to gain control over the two
houses of Congress and the Presidency. The Progressive synthesis shows
how the Court fits into this scheme. If the coalition holds together over a
long enough period, enough Justices will be appointed to allow this
sustained consensus among the citizenry to accomplish what it wants
through all three branches.
A second strength of the Progressive reduction of outcomes to politics is
that it allows us to identify two types of periods in Supreme Court
activity. The first is the period of sustained consensus, during which a
long-run coalition does hold together. Thus, the following list makes
sense in terms of the Progressive synthesis: the nationalism of the
Marshall Court; the Taney Court's participation in Southern domination
of the national political system; the era of Reconstruction, during which
moderate Republicans controlled all of the government; and the New
Deal period after 1937, during which the New Deal coalition had control
of all three branches of the government.5 0
The Progressive synthesis allows us to identify a second type of
Supreme Court activity: periods of transition in the political coalition.
Here there may be only one good example and one weaker example. The
first is the constitutional process of the New Deal when there was a sharp
discontinuity between the extrajudicial political system and judicial
politics. The New Deal coalition was not able to appoint enough Justices
fast enough for the courts to participate in the emerging coalition. The
weaker example is the Civil War period. There was a discontinuity there
but the Court did not provoke a crisis. Although Taney argued that
Lincoln's acts were completely unconstitutional, he had no effect in
politics at all.51

I would like to illustrate these general points by returning to the
histories I have already discussed. Loren Beth's contribution to the New
American Nation series is explicit: "We may assume that social and
economic development, and social, economic, and political theories, are
the forcing beds for constitutional change, and that in the main such
change is a response to the environment. ' '52 Beth's book does have a
curiously old-fashioned tone. In it, constitutional development occurs
because of undifferentiated "needs" and generalized "demands" to resolve
obvious "problems,"5 3 although Beth's discussion of Progressive reforms

50 Are there other such periods? It seems to me an open question is whether the New

Deal coalition continues to be politically dominant. If it is, we will have to think about the
current Supreme Court somewhat differently from the way we have become accustomed to.
5 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
52 L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1877-1917, at xiii (1971).
See, e.g., id. at 15 (noting "desire for, indeed the necessity of, government which could
respond to, but in addition control and even shape, the economic and social conditions which
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in politics is a useful, albeit preliminary, attempt to take account of
then-recent revisionist studies of elections.5 4 Similarly, Forrest McDonald attributes constitutional change to economic change: "The American
system of divided sovereignty simply could not keep pace with the
times . . . [and the Court] adjust[ed] the Constitution to fit the new
circumstances. .. .55
Paul Murphy's conceptualization stresses politics a bit more. He
focuses on persistent twentieth century crises as the underlying cause
and resulting recurrent concerns for change as the immediate cause of
constitutional change. But politics comes into its own in Belz's account of
constitutional development, which could almost be retitled "American
Politics: Their Origins and Development." Belz occasionally writes that
the Court adapted constitutional law "to changing social and economic
circumstances," but his basic view is that the Court's "new outlook . . . was shaped by political events and changes in the Court's
membership that reflected changes in American society." 56 Belz offers a
dominant and a subordinate theme. The dominant theme is that the main
developments in American politics, and therefore, in constitutional law,
were supported by "broad segments of middle-class" society.5 7 This
consensus explains why the Court endorsed "release of energy" principles
in the Jacksonian era, and progressivism in the early twentieth century.
The subordinate theme is that this broad middle-class consensus was
sometimes divided, for example, into one stream supporting laissez faire
constitutionalism and another supporting bureaucratic centralization.58
Belz's approach leads to at least three problems. Two are distinctive to
Belz. His emphasis on politics and consensus leaves him unable to offer a
cogent account of why the Court occasionally invalidates statutes. In the
early twentieth century, he says, the Court's invalidations "expressed the
reluctance of the society as a whole to move too rapidly toward positive
government and the regulatory state." s This may be completely vacuous.
But if it is not, one needs to ask why it was the Court that expressed that
reluctance rather than, for example, legislatures, which after all did not
adopt Bismarckian social welfare programs. The real issue, it seems, is

actually existed"). See also id. at 60-61 (centralization "a response to felt need.... [Als the
economics became national so did the problems which had to be handled").
51 Id. at 125-29.
" F. McDONALD, supra note 34, at 149. See also id. at 158-59 ("decisions proved to be out
of touch with the economic changes that were taking place .... As a result, the Court began

to alter its positions").

" KELLY, HARBISON, & BELZ, supra note 39, at 403-04. See also id. at 413-14 (income tax
decision explained by individual views of particular justices).
57 Id. at 419.
5" Id. at 545-55.
r9 Id. at 458.
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about differential reluctance to move too rapidly, or about what was too
rapid a pace, and Belz's approach cannot help on those issues.
In addition, Belz has difficulty in accommodating his normative disapproval of more recent developments to his conceptualization, which is,
basically, that the Court gives the American people what they want. This
difficulty emerges more in Belz's phrasings than in explicit arguments.
Thus, he describes Roosevelt's destroyer deal: "The country at large was
prepared to accede to the law of necessity rather than to cogent constitutional analysis."6° He writes of "the libertarian outlook of a majority of
the Supreme Court," rather than "of a large segment of the middle class,"
and attributes to the "media" and "academic circles" the view that the
Court's libertarianism after 1960 was evidence of public maturity, rather
approach would suggest he should, that
than saying, as his consensualist
61
their view was correct.
The third problem with Belz's approach is common to the Progressive
historiographical program. That program washes out too much detail, in
particular by focusing almost exclusively on results and patterns of
results rather than on doctrines. When constitutional law is reduced
directly to politics and economics, too many puzzles remain, which can be
overlooked only by looking solely at results and not at doctrine. If
constitutional law is reduced to politics, we need to know how the
political influences on the Court and legislatures differed so greatly that
judicial review ever took place. If it is reduced to economics, we need to
know why, out of all the ways in which the Constitution could have
adapted to economic change, American society pursued the particular
path that it did. Of course, I have been examining rather large-scale
overviews of constitutional history, and it is unfair to expect that they
have as much texture as would monographic studies. Nonetheless, the
Progressive synthesis seems a bit bland.
It also seems unlikely to help in examining the reverse direction of the
causal arrow. That is, if politics and economics drive constitutional
development, it will be fairly difficult to discover important areas in
which constitutional developments affect politics and economics. Apart
from biographical matters, this may explain Scheiber's focus on federalism, for it seems fairly straightforward to claim that the economic
consequences of having a federal system differ from those of having a
centralized one. Most obviously, federalism provides the opportunity for
capital to move in response to changes in local laws-characterized,
depending on one's political views, as the race to the bottom or voting
with one's feet. Similarly, it seems obvious that having a system of
separated powers affects the political process.

60

Id. at

61

Id. at 536, 599.

553.
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The Progressive synthesis obviously gets at something important. It is
clear that when we talk about a conservative decision we are talking
about something real in the Court's behavior. The Progressive synthesis
does identify and explain the Taney Court's greater sensitivity to states'
rights than the Marshall Court's. With all that, there are weaknesses in
the Progressive synthesis. Once again, I will move back to more general
points to identify two weaknesses. The second will lead me to development of the revisionist view.
The first weakness is that the Progressive synthesis has problems with
the transitional eras I have mentioned. Sometimes such eras can last too
long to be comfortably accommodated into the view that outcomes are
responsive to politics. The present situation may be one example. The
politics of the country have changed since 1968 and the Court has
changed as well, but the changes do not seem to be quite the same. And
it has been a long enough period for this lack of congruence to pose a
problem for the Progressive synthesis. Perhaps a new coalition has
emerged, one more complex than we can presently discern. A better
example is the Lochner era, which poses a severe problem for the
Progressive synthesis. For Lochner is an atypical decision of the era to
which it gives its name. The courts sustained more Progressive legislation supported by people then called progressive than the label
suggests. 62 Consider the commerce clause cases of that period, in which
the Supreme Court developed obviously inconsistent doctrine. It upheld
Progressive legislation in the Shreveport rate cases and in Champion v.
Ames and struck it down or interpreted the statutes in a way in light of
63
the Constitution so as to severely limit its scope in the E.C. Knight case.
What is the proper characterization of that set of decisions? The
pattern that historians have identified ranks what the Court was willing
to uphold.64 It was most willing to uphold state legislation invoking
traditional state police powers, such as health and safety regulations. It
was somewhat less receptive to less traditional police power regulations,
and even less receptive to state labor laws as such. 65 The Court was least
receptive to federal labor laws. Having identified that pattern, we can see
that it is difficult to figure out politically what it means. As we have seen,
historians tend to invoke the Progressive synthesis by saying that the
politics of the era were confused, yet it is not clear how enlightening that
is. For, if the public was not willing to move in the direction of the

62

See, e.g., J. SEMONCHE, CHAIflriG

SociETY, 1890-1920 (1978).
613

THE FUTURE: THE SUPEm COURT RESPONDS To A CHANGING

See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M.
See J. SEMONCHE, supra note 62.

TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

138-55 (1986).

65 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (examining skeptically a claim that
hours limitation promotes health, and rejecting the limitation when defended as labor law
"as such").
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regulatory state too fast, why, according to the Progressive synthesis,
should the Court have made the public move more slowly than it wanted
to, as indicated by the legislation it had adopted?
III.

LONG-TERM CONTINUITIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE:

A

SKETCH OF

A

REVISIONIST VIEW

One way to elaborate the Progressive synthesis would allow us to
explore the interaction between constitutional law and the political and
economic system in some non-tautologous way and at a level less general
than that of the overall structures of federalism and the separation of
powers. Like Scheiber, I am interested in federalism, and particularly, in
the question of when state laws are unconstitutional because they
interfere with interstate commerce. Belz, McDonald, and Murphy devote
essentially no space to that question in the modern post-New Deal era.
From the perspective of a constitutional lawyer, that is striking for two
reasons. The Supreme Court has regularly considered cases raising that
question; indeed, in recent years such cases constitute one of the larger
substantive categories of the Court's work. In addition, as mentioned
earlier, what the Court has to say about these cases seems linked, on the
level of animating metaphors, to what it says in other apparently quite
different areas.
Neglect of these dormant commerce clause issues is understandable
within the Progressive synthesis. According to that synthesis, the Court
enforced limitations on state power to regulate interstate commerce in
order to promote national economic integration. That integration having
been achieved in the twentieth century, the Court has to be dealing with
only the most trivial sorts of cases-as Justice Rehnquist once said, cases
about elk and minnows,6 6 which are hardly at the heart of today's
economy. So, according to the Progressive synthesis, there is no need to
discuss these cases in surveys of constitutional development, no matter
how interesting they are to lawyers.
As I have suggested, the utilization of animating metaphors across
substantive areas is itself interesting. Until the late nineteenth century,
the metaphor of direct/indirect made sense to the Supreme Court in a way
that is almost completely unintelligible today. 7 Since then, the metaphor
of balancing interests has taken hold. Belz describes the transitional
period, saying that the Court shifted from examining whether legislation
was inside or outside the bounds of the police power-a geometric version
of the direct/indirect metaphor-to examining whether it was a reason-

66 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67 But see Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. & New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.

573 (1986).
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able exercise of governmental power-a version of the balancing
metaphor. 68 Given his conceptualization, he finds it difficult to do more
than express normative disapproval of this shift.
Consider, however, the hypothesis that political and economic developments account for the shift in animating metaphors. If that hypothesis
is correct, some of the tautologies of the Progressive synthesis would
disappear. It would be less important- or it would be a phenomenon to be
explained on some other level-that the Supreme Court inconsistently
upheld or invalidated statutes in the Lochner era in ways explicable
solely by the personal preferences of the Justices. What would be
interesting, and explained by this hypothesis, is that the invalidations
and the upholdings invoked standards of reasonableness rather than
"inside/outside" metaphors. Another consequence might be a reperiodization of constitutional history. The animating force of metaphors appears to have persisted over long periods; indeed, I would suggest, at least
as a preliminary, that there have been only two periods since the
framing, one-the "direct/indirect" period-lasting until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, and the other-the "balancing"
period-since the early twentieth century. I will conclude this essay by
examining the first of these periods, exploring, in an admittedly speculative way, the connections between slavery and the structure of constitutional doctrine regarding the domains of national and state power.
I begin by examining the Progressive account of that doctrine in which
political contention over slavery shaped the Supreme Court's approach to
questions of states' rights. A relatively direct reduction of doctrine to
politics, while illuminating, leaves important elements of the doctrine
unexplained, and indeed, quite anomalous. I then attempt to offer a more
satisfying account by developing the implications of the argument,
adopted by the Marshall Court and adhered to under Taney, that questions of national authority to act were questions of discretion, not of
power.6 9 That position created serious political difficulties as the years
went on. The political difficulties were compounded by a set of doctrinal
problems that emerged when a second argument was added to the
doctrinal structure. That argument took the powers of government to be
divided between states and nation into spheres that were both exclusive.
If a power was lodged in one government, it could not be concurrently
70
lodged in another. All governmental powers were lodged somewhere,
Here, too, doctrinal problems arose. In the end, the doctrinal structure of
antebellum constitutional law was fundamentally flawed by the effort to

s KELLY, HARBISON, & BELz, supra note 39, at 415-16.
69 The formulation is Justice Sutherland's, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,

291 (1936).
70 A further elaboration would define the subject as "powers of action," and would

include citizens as occupying their own sphere of power.
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incorporate both the "discretion" and "exclusive spheres" arguments.
These doctrinal analyses lead to the conclusion that the effort to incorporate both arguments derived from the economic and cultural situation
of the nation, in which the contradictory cultures of slavery and capitalism were joined in a political union.
A.

The Progressive Synthesis: States' Rights and
the Politics of Slavery

The usual interpretation of antebellum constitutional law accepts as a
central fact that, with minor exceptions explicable in short-run political
terms, 7'1 states' rights theories of the Constitution 72 were asserted by
Southerners. The usual explanation is that expansive interpretations of
national power would have authorized Congress to take actions that
could impair the vitality of slavery. For example, if Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce was broadly defined, Congress could prohibit the interstate trade in slaves. States' rights constitutional theories,
it is argued, provided a general framework into which the specific concern
73
about slavery could be inserted.
In opposition to these states' rights theories, nationalist theories of the
Constitution arose. In its Whig version, the account treats those who
propounded nationalist theories as far-sighted statesmen who envisioned
an expanding American economy whose growth was encouraged by
sensible exercises of national power. The plausibility of the Whig account
is enhanced by the fact that the nationalists cannot be so readily
identified as sectionalists, as can the states' rights theorists.
The protagonists in this account in the Supreme Court are, of course,
John Marshall and Roger Taney. Marshall's accomplishment is two-fold.
He established the principle that the Supreme Court had authority to
determine whether or not actions taken elsewhere in the governmentnational as well as state-were consistent with the Constitution. He used
that principle to endorse broad, nationalist interpretations of national
power in the familiar classics of McCulloch u. Maryland7 4 and Gibbons v.
Ogden.7 5 His successor, rather more closed-minded about slavery and,
perhaps more important, holding office during a period of sustained

71

See, e.g., D.

FISHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE FEDERALIST PARTY IN THE

ERA OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 176-77 (1965) (describing Hartford Convention).
72 That is, theories in which a central role is played by limitations on national power in

order to preserve an important domain of action for state governments.
71 Such theories explained opposition to congressional support of internal improvements. In addition, it may be that Southern states' rights theorists were concerned that a
Congress accustomed to exercising power in an area not implicating slavery might find it
easier to do so even when slavery was involved.
74 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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political challenges to slavery, attempted to restrain the nationalist
theory of the Constitution that Marshall established. Fortunately for the
Whigs, Taney was unable to do so, and constitutional doctrine after the
Civil War took up where Marshall left off, strengthened of course, by the
nationalizing of civil rights in the Reconstruction Amendments.
The account just sketched obviously says something about the structure of antebellum constitutional doctrine, at least in identifying the
conflict between states' rights and nationalist theories and in treating the
latter as the dominant theories during the period. Yet, closer examination of the structure exposes some anomalies. Let us consider a few that
provide the background for the alternative interpretation offered in the
rest of this essay.
First, there is some tension between the usual interpretation of
constitutional doctrine and the equally ordinary sense we have that over
the medium run patterns of behavior in the national legislature and in
the national courts are likely to be roughly similar. But, national politics
up to the start of the Civil War were dominated by the South, the locus of
states' rights constitutional theories. One would expect such theories to
come to prevail on the Supreme Court, particularly in light of the Court's
putative responsiveness to the interests of slavery in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.6 Of course, the Court had few direct opportunities to articulate states' rights theories precisely because of Southern dominance in
national politics: If Congress never enacts statutes testing the limits of its
power, the Court will never have a chance to discuss what those limits
are. The most we can expect are opinions upholding state regulations in
the face of claims that some federal statute or constitutional provision
preempted the regulation. The Taney Court's retreat from Marshall's
nationalism occurred in just that way. 77 Still, the asserted retrenchment
seems a little weaker than one would expect from examining national
politics as a guide to constitutional doctrine.
Second, the usual interpretation has to be modified to take account of
8
the Taney
a number of fairly important cases. In Priggv. Pennsylvania,7
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, in
the face of the fact that the fugitive slave clause appeared in article IV,
79
not article I, and did not explicitly confer power on Congress to act. It

adopted an even more nationalist theory of the constitutional scheme in
striking down Wisconsin's effort directly to interfere with the rendition of
fugitive slaves.80 Perhaps the Taney Court could be seen as merely

60 U.s. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
" See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); The License Cases, 46 U.S.

76

(5 How.) 504 (1847).
78

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).

79

Id.

8o

Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
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opportunistic rather than guided by theories of the constitutional structure: a fervid defender of national authority when national power was
exercised in the interest of slavery, states' rights otherwise. 81 I offer a
different explanation later in this essay.
Third, however, some sort of theory does seem to have been at work,
although here the evidence is rather indirect. For reasons explored later
in this essay, Justice Story regarded his opinion for the Court in Priggas
a strong antislavery statement because, in addition to affirming national
power, it authorized states to withhold their aid from those pursuing
fugitives. After the Civil War, the Supreme Court adopted the view the
Taney Court took in the Wisconsin case, quoting extensively from
82
Taney's opinion with no apparent sense of embarrassment or irony.
Finally, there is Kentucky v. Dennison,8 3 where a free black was charged
with assisting a slave to escape from the slave's owner. The Taney Court
held that the rendition clause of article IV placed only a moral, but not a
legal, obligation on state officials to comply with a request to extradite
persons charged with crime. 4 The best the usual interpretation can do is
treat Dennison as a case arising so close to the outbreak of the Civil War
that Taney simply resigned himself, and his Court, to their inability to
assist the slave interest any longer.85
So far I have only pointed out in the most general terms some
anomalies with which the Progressive synthesis must deal, and have
suggested that it cannot do so very effectively. The remainder of the essay
examines both the assertedly dominant themes and the anomalies in
greater detail, in an effort to develop a more adequate account of the
development of the structure of antebellum constitutional doctrine.
B. Discretionand Power in the Theory of National Authority
The antebellum Court's defense of broad national power was simple. In
each leading case, the Court held that Congress' power was not subject to
limitations that courts would enforce, but rather that the remedy for
abuses of power was political. This theory raised two related difficulties
as time passed. Southerners eventually lost confidence that the national
political process would protect them against the particular kinds of
abuses of national power they most feared, and the tension between
Marbury v. Madison and the Court's theory of national power, which did
not present serious difficulties when the political climate was not too
unfavorable, became dramatic as sectional politics became heated. This

81 But see supra note

6 on the use of states' rights theories in political debates.

8 Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
83 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
14

See id. which was overruled in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987).

"' See 2

C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISroRy 367 (1926).
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section explains these conclusions by examining three classic cases in
which the Court adopted the "political checks" theory, and then by
discussing the ways in which that theory became difficult to sustain.
Although it was chronologically the third of the classic cases, Gibbons v. Ogden86 most clearly presented the Court's theory of national
power. 8 7 The New York legislature had granted a monopoly of steamboat
use in New York waters to Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston. They
assigned their rights to Ogden, who subsequently sought an injunction
against a competitor. New York's highest court agreed that an injunction
should issue. The Supreme Court reversed, on the ground that a federal
law granting licenses to ships preempted state regulation.
The first part of Marshall's opinion discussed the scope of national
power.8 8 It analyzed the three parts of the commerce clause, and gave to
each an expansive reading. Congress' power to "regulate" interstate
commerce was not limited to a power to displace state regulations which
interfered with the free flow of trade across state lines.8 9 However, as
Justice Johnson's concurring opinion pointed out, such a limited power
would have been sufficient both to allay the framers' primary concern
about the impediments states were placing in the way of commerce, and
to dispose of the case at hand. 90 Rather, the power was the power to
"prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." Further,
"commerce" was not limited to transactions involving goods used in
production or consumption. 91
Finally, and most important for the future and for this essay, "among
the several States" was given a broad definition, the scope of which is best
defined by Marshall. Marshall suggested that Congress could not regulate matters that satisfied three conditions, stated in the conjunctive: The
commerce must be between "man and man in a [single] state," it must not
"affect other states," and, most important for the present theme, regulation must not be necessary. 92 Yet, subject to qualifications discussed
below, the issue would arise only after Congress, by enacting some
statute, had determined that regulation was necessary. Marshall acknowledged that it was unlikely that the courts would override Congress'
decision. He concluded this portion of his opinion with a classic formulation of the "political checks" theory:

8 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
87 Id.

1 Under current law, this discussion would be reievant to the question of whether
Congress had power to adopt the licensing law. Section C, below, describes the rather
different way in which the issue was relevant to Marshall's analysis.
s1 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97.
90 Id. at 224-27 (Johnson, J., concurring).
91 Id. at 192-94.
92 Id. at 194-96.
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If. . . the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified
objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce... is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in
a single government.... The wisdom and discretion of Congress,
their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other
instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse.
must often rely
They are the restraints on which the people
93
solely, in all representative governments.
That theory had appeared in a slightly different guise in McCulloch v.
Maryland.94 Maryland had defended the tax it imposed on the operation
of the Bank of the United States on the ground that the power to tax was
an essential attribute of sovereignty. It pointed out that the national
government had the power to impose taxes on activities important to
Maryland, a result that flowed from the fact that the national government was indeed a sovereign. To this Marshall offered the "political
checks" theory in response. When Congress imposed a tax on residents of
Maryland, or when the Maryland legislature did so, it "act[ed] upon its
constituents. ' 95 Under those circumstances, the ordinary operations of
politics-the responsiveness of legislators to the wishes of their constituents-assured that the power to tax would not be abused. It was
unnecessary to interpose the courts as a further guarantee against abuse,
especially since, if judicial review was authorized in these circumstances,
society ran the risk of courts improvidently overturning perfectly proper
exercises of power. Further, in Congress "all [are] represented" 96 so that
its decisions could be taken to express the national interest. In contrast,
Maryland's legislators did not represent people out of the state who would
be affected by the tax imposed on the Bank. Because of this failure of
representation, some branch of the national government had to be in a
position to block the implementation of Maryland's plan. 9 7 Thus, in

McCulloch, the propriety of judicial review was tied to an evaluation of
the operation of the political process. On the national level, all were
represented in that process, and national power was therefore not subject
to limitations the courts would enforce.
Perhaps the earliest major case treating the scope of national power as

93 Id. at 197.

"4 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
95 Id. at 428.
96

Id. at 431.

" The branch could be either Congress, by enacting an express exemption for the Bank
from state taxation, or the courts, by construing the applicable statutes to contain an

implicit exemption (the modern approach) or by developing some sort of intergovernmental
immunity rooted in the Constitution.
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a question of discretion subject to political checks alone rather than one
of power subject to judicial review was Martinv. Hunter's Lessee.98 There
the Court upheld the constitutionality of section 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, which authorized the Supreme Court to review decisions of state
courts in which questions of national law were implicated. 99 The Virginia
court had agreed that its members as individuals were bound by the
supremacy clause and their oaths of office to apply and carefully interpret
national law. The judges insisted that their court,'as an institution, could
not be integrated into the national court system. If Congress thought that
the Virginia judges' position would lead to a lack of uniformity in the
interpretation of national law, it could create a system of national courts
to which every case implicating national law could be routed.
The Virginia judges understood that their proposal raised serious
practical difficulties. Wholly apart from the expense of maintaining a
comprehensive system of national courts, there was an obvious problem.
It arose in a case filed by a plaintiff whose complaint raised only issues of
local law, against a defendant who wished to raise an issue of national
law in defense or as a counterclaim. Because the complaint did not
implicate national law, it could not have been filed in a national court,
even under the Virginia judges' proposal. They, therefore, acknowledged
that Congress could provide a mechanism by which cases initially filed in
state courts could be removed to the national courts. This concession
proved fatal to their argument. If removal was permissible according to
the Virginia judges' theory, it was possible to treat direct review by the
Supreme Court of state court judgments as a form of post-decision
removal. The issue then became one of determining the limits on
Congress' power to structure a system of removal. Justice Story wrote
that the timing and method of removal were "subject to [Congress']
absolute legislative control." 10°
By 1830 then, the Supreme Court had in controversial cases repeatedly
adopted a theory of national power that placed the authority to enforce
limitations on national power not in the courts, but in the electorate. The
political and doctrinal difficulties with this theory emerged in the next
decades. From a states' rights point of view, the Court's theory, while
imperfect, was satisfactory so long as opponents of national power were
confident that the national electorate shared their view. In those circumstances, the electoral checks would operate to assure that national power
was not abused. In fact, confidence in states' rights was entirely justified
by Congress' actions, or more precisely, its inaction. It did not enact, nor
did any President sign, legislation that pressed the limits of even

98 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

9 This formulation is designed to finesse the issue of the scope of the statutory
provision. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
'00 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 319.
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moderate theories of national power. Yet, as the period wore on, Southern
politicians became increasingly nervous that their political control over
the national government would not last much longer. When such doubts
arose, the "political checks" theory of national power could not suffice.
In a different guise, uncertainty about continued political control
exacerbated an important doctrinal tension between the "political
checks" theory and the underlying theory of Marbury v. Madison.
Marshall justified judicial review in Marbury by insisting that the
Constitution was a legal document like a contract or a statute. Of course
by its own terms the Constitution was supreme, but the courts' role in
constitutional disputes was identical to their role in contractual ones:
They were to interpret the relevant documents and enforce the proper
interpretation as they saw it. If one believed that federalism, the
preservation of a significant governmental role for the states, was
embedded in the Constitution,'"' it would seem to follow from Marbury
that the courts should enforce federalism-based limitations on national
power. Yet, that is just what the "political checks" theory denied.
There were two ways to resolve the tension between Marbury and the
"political checks" theory. One was built into Marburyitself. In discussing
whether mandamus was a proper remedy for Madison's failure to deliver
Marbury's commission, Marshall invoked the traditional distinction
between a public officer's mandatory and discretionary duties: "The
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not
to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution ...submitted to the executive, can never be made
in this court."10 2 This thought might be generalized so as to treat

federalism issues as "political," or ones in which the other branches
"ha[d] a discretion." The generalization might be supported by the
observation that federalism issues do not directly implicate "the rights of
individuals."
There is nothing that makes this resolution of the tension between
Marbury's underlying theory and the "political checks" theory impossible. The resolution would divide constitutional provisions into two
groups, those directly protecting individual rights, which the courts will
enforce, and those protecting federalism, which the courts will not
enforce. In its early formulations, however, this resolution was unsatisfactory. Marshall did not offer an explanation for the division. Presumably, it would have taken the form of affirming the effectiveness of

101

This restriction would be located in the tenth amendment, or as a structural

assumption pervading the entire document.
102

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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political checks in protecting individual rights. It is unlikely that an
argument cast in that form would have been persuasive at the time.
A second resolution would have been persuasive, but only so long as a
broad political consensus existed. Marshall's defense of judicial review
required that the courts be able to interpret the Constitution in a
relatively uncontroversial way. Obviously, no interpretation could be
completely uncontroversial; if it were, the legislation at issue could not
have been enacted in the first place. Secure reliance on interpretation
required that there be acknowledged bounds on the meanings of words. If
the accepted constructionoa of Madison's political vision, as expressed in
Federalist 10, explained the "political checks" theory, then an alternative
vision of politics can be drawn from the tradition of civic republicanismo4
to explain Marshall's confidence in the viability of interpretation. Interpretation could resolve disputes over the meaning of the Constitution
when everyone was assumed to be acting to promote the public good,
conceived of as something more than the aggregation of private
interests. 05
That assumption is exactly what could no longer be made as the
political consensus that insulated the slave system from attack began to
break down. It was not merely symptomatic that antislavery publicists
began to develop arguments supporting their conclusion that slavery was
unconstitutional.10 6 Under canons of interpretation that Marshall and
his generation accepted, those arguments were quite simply bizarre. The
Constitution, by implications that were clear under those canons, plainly
recognized the existence of slavery, and the framers certainly understood,
as "understanding" was itself understood under the same canons, that
they were not disturbing slavery by adopting the Constitution. Still, the
antislavery publicists rejected those canons of interpretation and offered
their own as replacements. Once that occurred, the possibility of interpretation as a method of resolving constitutional disputes simply disappeared.
The crisis of the political system was thus a constitutional crisis in at
least two senses. It was a conflict over what the Constitution meant; it
was also a conflict over what people meant when they spoke of what the
Constitution meant. The directly political disputes and the cognate
doctrinal difficulties made the dominant "political checks" theory unstable. As I argue next, the instability was not merely the result of political
conflict, but was inherent in the theory itself.

10'

That is, the interpretation offered by R. DAHL, A PREFACE

TODEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).

104 See, e.g., G. WiLLs, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981); G. WOOD, TE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPURLIC,

1776-1887 (1969).

105 See Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretationand Judicial Selection: A View From the

FederalistPapers, S.
"'

CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming).
W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTmLAVERY CONSTrruTONALISM,
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C.

The Spheres of Governmental Authority

If it arose today, one would not expect Gibbons v. OgdenO7 to provoke
deep discussions of constitutional theory. The only issue would be the
preemptive effect of a national law; Congress' power to enact the
licensing law would get a passing mention. Needless to say, Marshall and
his contemporaries had a different view of the problem. Marshall discussed the scope of congressional power in Gibbons because that issue
was raised by an argument that Marshall agreed had "great force."108
The argument was indeed the concealed or open premise of much
antebellum constitutional theory: It was that governmental authority
was unitary and exclusive. That is, a particular governmental power
could be lodged in only one government, and if the power rested with one,
no other government could exercise that power. For example, if New
York's grant of a monopoly to Fulton and Livingston was a regulation of
interstate commerce, it was unconstitutional without regard to the
national licensing law because only Congress had the power to regulate
interstate commerce.
I will examine in a moment the depth to which the theory of unitary
and exclusive powers penetrated antebellum constitutional thought. It is
worth noting at the outset the obvious problems the theory raised. If
Congress' powers were broadly construed, large areas of social life would
go effectively unregulated. Congress lacked both the resources and the
inclination to regulate broadly, and the states, under this theory, lacked
the power to do so. Justice Johnson, in Gibbons, offered a narrow
construction of congressional power just to avoid that result: He would
have limited Congress' power to one allowing it to override impediments
the states placed in the way of the free flow of commerce. The Court,
having rejected that construction, was led to a doctrinal tangle from
which it emerged, if at all, only after civil war. The doctrinal hook was to
distinguish, for example, between exercises of a power to regulate
interstate commerce, committed to Congress, and exercises of other
powers-the police powers-retained by the states. Because the state, in
exercising its police powers, could control some subject matter that
Congress could also control in exercising its commerce power, this
distinction rapidly became rather strained. The difficulties that lay ahead
may have led Marshall to avoid committing the Court in Gibbons to the
theory of unitary and exclusive powers. For reasons taken up later in this
essay, the Court nonetheless became committed to that theory anyway.
The obvious doctrinal difficulties the theory created make it important
to describe in greater detail what the antebellum Court actually did. Four
significant cases show how deeply the Court held the theory despite both

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
'08 Id. at 209.
107
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doctrinal and political problems. The first is Cooley v. Board of
Wardens,l0 9 in which the Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Philadelphia's system of regulating entry into its harbor. 110
Although Cooley is generally taken to express the settled law even today,
two points in its analysis, which are puzzling to contemporary thought,
deserve mention here. The first is its exact formulation of the relevant
doctrine.
IT]he power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite
unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United
States in every port; and some .

.

. as imperatively demanding

that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of
navigation."'
This divides matters into two exclusive categories, one imperatively
requiring uniform national regulation and the other as imperatively
requiring varying local regulation. This formulation ignores two possibilities. Some subjects might, as a matter of judgment, be placed under
national regulation, and Congress might place other subjects under a
regime of regulation that varied according to local conditions. In ignoring
those possibilities, the formulation reflected a cast of mind that insisted
on dividing subjects between national and local authority, each exclusive
in its own sphere.
The Court ignored the second possibility just mentioned (that of
nationally-promulgated varying regulations) in a particularly dramatic
way. It had before it, in Cooley, a statute that apparently did just that. A
national law, enacted in 1789, declared that pilotage in local ports would
be regulated according to local laws, until Congress declared otherwise.
On its face, this statute resolved the issue in Cooley. The Court refused to
treat the statute as dispositive, however, because to do so would mean
that Congress had delegated "its" power to regulate interstate commerce
to a state or local government, something the theory of unitary and
exclusive powers could not tolerate.112 Instead, the Court treated this
(now legally-ineffective) statute as evidence supporting the Court's own
judgment that pilotage was an "imperatively local" subject.
3
The second case, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, was mentioned earlier."
Prigg,upholding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,

109 53 U.s. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
110 Id- at 302-04.
111 Id. at 319.
112 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
1973).
113 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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can be seen as a strongly nationalist and proslavery decision. Its
nationalism lay in its affirmation of congressional power even though no
specific grant of power in article I encompassed the Fugitive Slave Act. In
that aspect, one is not surprised that Justice Joseph Story wrote the
Court's opinion. Modern commentators have been puzzled at Story's
statement to his son that Prigg was also an antislavery decision, not a
proslavery one.1 14 Story's interpretation was based on a part of the
opinion which asserted that states need not assist national officials in
enforcing national law. 115 Assuming that Congress would be reluctant to
create what would amount to a substantial national police force, Story
believed that his opinion would seriously impair the effective enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. Notably, the opinion in Priggpresumed
the validity of the theory of unitary and exclusive powers: The states,
having absolute power over the activities of their own officers, could
ignore national law if they wanted to.116

Ableman v. Booth" 7 involved another aspect of the controversy over
the recapture of fugitive slaves. Not content to leave enforcement entirely
to officials of the national government, Wisconsin's judges sought affirmatively to obstruct enforcement by directing the national officials to
release a person convicted of aiding a fugitive slave to escape from federal
custody. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion in 1859, would have
none of this.is Taney's opinion for the Court contains some of the most
powerful statements about the supremacy of national law in the antebellum reports. It acknowledged Wisconsin's sovereignty, but insisted that it
was "limited" by the constitutional scheme:
[T]he powers of the General government and of the State,
although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective
spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United
States, is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by

114 See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS241

(1975).

... Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622-26 (1842).

11 Doctrinally, this might have been evaded by treating the national law as designating
state officers as federal ones for enforcement purposes. That, however, is in tension with
some of the positions taken in the correspondence of the Justices dealing with the
controversy in 1791-92 over whether they could serve as commissioners to decide the
validity of pension claims. Some of the Justices believed that it was incompatible with their
role as judges to serve as commissioners at Congress' designation, particularly where the
statute named the Justices in their official, rather than in their personal, capacities. See
Hayburn's Case, 2 ENCYCL. OF AM. CoNT. 908 (1986).
117 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
Id.
ll
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a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced
by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. 119
The national government, according to Taney, was supreme "in the
sphere of action assigned to it." Conflicts between the states and the
nation would be resolved in the national, not the state courts. Once again,
national power and state autonomy, each within its proper sphere, were
affirmed in an opinion advancing the interests of slaveowners.
The theory of unitary and exclusive powers turned against the South,
however, in Kentucky v. Dennison.120 The State of Kentucky invoked the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, seeking an order that would
compel the Governor of Ohio to "deliver[] up" a fugitive from justice. As
we have seen, the case involved a person charged with assisting a slave
to escape from her master. The Court denied relief, holding that the
applicable provision of article IV imposed only a moral obligation on the
Governor, not a legally enforceable one. Taken in its broadest implications, the idea that constitutional provisions impose only moral obligations threatens the basis of Marbury v. Madison, for one might then say
that the Constitution's provisions defining the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court imposed moral, not legally enforceable,
duties on Congress. The Court forestalled these implications by invoking
the theory of unitary and exclusive powers. It was with respect to states
and their governors that the Constitution imposed only moral duties.
"IT]he Federal government, under the Constitution, has no power to
impose on a State Officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to
"121
"..
perform it .
However, at this point the theory came into acute tension with
expansive views of congressional power. For what was to distinguish the
states' merely moral duty to deliver up fugitives from justice, from their
legally enforceable duty not to interfere with interstate commerce?
Presumably, only that Congress had within its sphere broad authority to
regulate commerce. Yet, that implies that Congress' power within its
sphere affects the states' authority within their spheres by creating
legally enforceable obligations. Once again, it would seem that Marshall
was correct to refrain from accepting the theory of unitary and exclusive
powers, and that the Court could not follow his lead wholeheartedly.
One is tempted to write off Dennison as an aberration, the Court there
resigning itself to its inability in 1860 to advance proslavery theories of
the Constitution. That temptation should be resisted. Dennison applied a
theory of governmental authority to which the antebellum Court had

119

Id. at 516.

120 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
121

Id. at 107.
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been repeatedly drawn, doctrinal and political difficulties notwithstanding. The next section sketches an explanation for this state of affairs.
D. The Spheres of Authority in the Legal Ideology of
Slave and Bourgeois Societies
Antebellum constitutional theory had two components: a theory of
expansive national power constrained by political forces, and a theory of
the allocation of authority between state and nation according to which
powers were exclusively exercised by the body that had them. These
theories created doctrinal and political difficulties, as we have seen, and
were in some tension with each other. The structure of constitutional
theory attempted to accommodate both.
I suggest that the reason for this lies in fundamentals of ideology and
politics rather than in the particular details of political contention at any
one time. 122 The legal ideologies associated with slave and bourgeois
social relations shared enough in common to make it possible for the
courts to begin to develop constitutional theories that were consistent
with both. The legacy of the political and economic struggle that had
formed bourgeois society, and the political and economic conflict between
slave and bourgeois society, introduced internal conflict into the structure of constitutional theory. Until one or the other achieved a complete
victory, a unified structure of theory could not be developed.
The legal ideologies of slave and bourgeois social relations agreed that
property ownership entailed exclusive rights to use the property. They
disagreed only in that slave law acknowledged the ability to own, and so
to have exclusive rights over, everything, while bourgeois law allowed
owners to acquire another person's labor power but not another person
tout court.1 23 Taking their fundamental areas of agreement, both ideolo-

gies could generalize the vision of appropriate social relations from an
owner's absolute and exclusive authority over property, to a government's absolute and exclusive authority over subjects committed to it. In
this way, the theory of unitary and exclusive governmental powers
mirrored the shared vision of property in slave and bourgeois law.
That vision posed problems for bourgeois law, however. First, the
evident conflict between slave and bourgeois society, more apparent as
time went on, made it difficult to sustain a legal ideology on which slave

122 The underlying argument with respect to slavery is developed in M.

TUSHNET,

THE

AMERiCAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1980).
' Neither of these outcomes is completely stable. As to bourgeois law, there is the
inevitable difficulty that the system cannot allow property rights to be acquired through

force and fraud, and yet there are no straight-forward definitions of force and fraud
available to bourgeois law. As to slave law, problems arose in connection with the question
of whether a slave could own another slave and, in the United States, whether a free black
could own a slave. For an introduction, see id. at 49-53.
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and bourgeois visions of appropriate social relations converged. Bourgeois ideologies could not be comfortable with a structure of thought
entirely congenial to the legal ideology of slavery. As against the image
of spheres of authority insulated from each other, the theory of expansive
national power, checked by political forces, offered an image of spheres of
authority that interpenetrated: National authority could reach into the
states' domain, but the political checks allowed the states to act within
the national government.
Second, and more important, bourgeois legal ideology had been shaped
by two forces, not one. It strove to establish the property owner's absolute
and exclusive right to use property. It had to do so, however, in a context
in which the bourgeoisie was faced with an entrenched landed aristocracy. Merely to establish absolute property rights would preserve rather
than displace the aristocracy. Under some circumstances, a class alliance
was worked out. In the Anglo-American system, the bourgeoisie overcame the aristocracy by capturing control of governmental power and
using that power to destabilize the settled positions of their opponents. In
justifying those uses of governmental power, bourgeois legal ideologists
had to reject the argument that the present owners of property had
absolute rights. 124 At least for the duration of the struggle, the law had
to recognize interpenetrating power, if only in the hope of later recognizing absolute spheres of power.
The ideology of slavery was different. Masters confront their slaves and
the slaves confront their masters in the totality of their lives. That kind
of totalistic relationship promotes a metaphor of interdependence of the
master and slave. The translation of that metaphor into ideology is
balancing. In contrast, employers confront workers only in part of their
lives. And it is that partial confrontation that produces the metaphor of
categories of boundedness: The master-slave relationship is unbounded,
while the employer-worker relationship is bounded by the economic
market.
The culture of the slave owners was striving to articulate a balancing
interdependence metaphor, as in the proslavery literature's effort to
characterize the relationship between the master and slave as a familial
relationship, to criticize capitalism as heartless, and the like. Though the
South was striving to develop this culture, it never succeeded because the
South lost the war. Yet, there is a problem here. Before 1860, the Court
was Southern dominated, and yet on my analysis, adopted a categorical
approach. What is the explanation for that? First, the picture must be
qualified, for there was some balancing. The more important point is that
te Cour' useu the categorical approach in the 1860's because that was

124

See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28

205 (1979); Nedelsky, Book Review, 96 HARV. L.

REV.
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the best that could be done to alleviate the political dilemma of the South.
Balancing in the political circumstances of the time would have authorized federal intrusion on slave society. It would have authorized, for
example, federal control of the interstate slave trade, which for political
and ideological reasons, the South could not tolerate. The dilemma meant
that the conflict between categorical approaches and balancing approaches was unresolved until the South lost.
In a sense then, the contradictions of antebellum constitutional theory
reproduced the contradictions of bourgeois and slave legal ideology.
Absolute power was recognized but denied: recognized because it was the
ideal end toward which both ideologies was working; denied because it
was inconsistent with the legacy of one political struggle and with the
conduct of another ongoing one.
This account provides a way of seeing constitutional theory from the
Southern point of view as well. It suggests that the Progressive synthesis
is accurate on a deeper level than first appeared. Strongly nationalist
theories were indeed the dominant ones. In their struggle for cultural
autonomy, slaveowners had to combat those theories by developing
theories of absolute power. There was ideological space for that development because the theories were not inconsistent with one element in
bourgeois legal thought. Yet, Southerners could not make those theories
dominant for two reasons. First, as the outcome of the Civil War
indicates, slave society lacked the force to overcome the power of a
worldwide bourgeois political economy. Second, the immediate pressures
of political struggle made it imperative for the South to be in a position
to exploit national power when it could. The result was to confine the
structure of constitutional theory to the contradictions of bourgeois legal
thought.
IV.

CONCLUSION

After the Civil War, Edward Tarble, then a minor, enlisted in the
Army. Because his father had not given consent, the enlistment violated
federal law. His father obtained a writ directing that Tarble be released
from the Army. The writ was issued by the Wisconsin state courts, which
obviously believed that Ableman v. Booth had been a case about slavery
and so was no longer good law. The Supreme Court forcefully
disagreed.] 25 Its opinion quoted extensively from Ableman and reiterated
the theory of that case. The national government was "distinct and
independent" from the states:
There are within the territorial limits of each State two govern-

125

Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
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ments, restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of
each other, and supreme within their respective spheres....
Neither government can intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein ... with the action of the other.
The two governments in each State stand in their respective
spheres of action in the same independent relation to each other,
except [as regulated by the supremacy clause],126that they would if
their authority embraced distinct territories.
The era of dual federalism that the Civil War ushered in was made
possible by the elimination of the ideological and cultural threat slave
society posed to bourgeois society. Having overcome the source of the
objections to the theory of unitary and exclusive powers, bourgeois legal
ideologists were able, for a short while, to develop that theory. Lochner's
distinction between police power regulations and labor laws as such was
the late nineteenth century's version of this approach. 127 New contradictions developed which led to the replacement of this categorizing approach by the twentieth century's balancing approach. The transition
may be symbolized by Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Lochner,
which made the constitutional test one of general reasonableness.128
Because balancing is our natural way of thinking about constitutional
law, I am not going to discuss it in detail. Examples could be drawn from
virtually every area of constitutional law and virtually every decade in
the twentieth century. 129 Instead, I want to stress several points in
conclusion. First, I have offered a different periodization from the
Progressive synthesis. The Progressive synthesis looks for medium term
continuity in the political arena, drawing on ideas like nationalism,
Southern domination of national politics, Reconstruction, and the like. I
have suggested that there is a different periodization: roughly, from the
framing to the 1870's, a transitional period from the 1870's to the 1920's,
and the modern era.130 This periodization identifies a continuity in
general approach between antebellum law and the Lochner era. Second,
this analysis does not deal with outcomes of particular cases. For
example, under this analysis Lochner-era invalidations are reasonableness balancing cases just as is the modern view of state regulation of
interstate commerce, whereas Cooley takes a categorization approach.
I am convinced that these modes of analyzing legal problems do exist,

126

Id. at 406-07.

See Kennedy, Toward an HistoricalUnderstandingof Legal Consciousness: The Case
of ClassicalLegal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SocioLOGY 3 (1980).
127

12'

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

129

See generally Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96

YALE

L.J. 943

(1987).
130 There may be a pre-1820 period, but I am not familiar enough with the materials to
be comfortable with a finer periodization.
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and that my suggested periodization is roughly correct. In other words,
there is a period in which categorization is dominant, and then there is,
later on, a period in which balancing is dominant, although at every
period both modes are employed.
Finally, what is the explanation for this sort of long term continuity in
approach? As the structure of this essay suggests, I am more confident of
my explanation of the first period than of the second, that is, of the
categorization period than of the balancing period. I have suggested that
the explanation operates on the level of ideology, by which I mean, the
attempt on the part of people to make sense of their world, and that
ideology rests primarily on economic relations.
Finally, what of the emergence of balancing in this century? Again it
seems to me that it is an ideological effort to make sense of the world of
the regulatory welfare state. Consider the criticisms offered by people
like Frederick von Hayek of administrative agencies as in conflict with
the rule of law. Such agencies do not act according to pre-existing general
rule. They make targeted grants to corporations; public assistance is
individually determined with reference to a recipient's need in light of a
strongly discretionary decision by a welfare worker. The Administrative
Procedure Act and constitutional litigation about welfare rights illustrate efforts to control this non-rule of law behavior by imposing the rule
of law. 31 There is an alternative approach which is to reformulate the
idea of the rule of law to accommodate this kind of behavior. The
reformulation is precisely the balancing metaphor. Instead of the hard
edge of the classical rule of law of pre-existing general rules determining
what ought to be done, we have the image that the right way to do things
is to take everything into account and balance.
Let me conclude with some qualifications. Historically, the categorical
and balancing modes of thinking about law were in competition with each
other, It is a question of dominance and subordination, not triumph and
defeat. Here, our examples might be the Supreme Court's recent separation of powers cases. These constitute an effort to make sense explicitly of
the modern administrative state. The Court has invoked rigidly categorical approaches, and not surprisingly, has been severely criticized by
academics for not having taken up a sensible balancing approach to the
problem. 132 In my view, the reason for the persistence of categorizing and
balancing is that the mode of production is contradictory. It alienates
personality which always strives to assert itself. No matter what the
predominant mode of alienation is, either categorization or balancing, the
other side attempts to prevail. Finally, what that means is that the

131 See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J.
1198 (1983).
132 See generally The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus of Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.

L. Rev. 277-601 (1987).
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picture is going to be extremely complicated when it is filled in. That
returns us to my opening comment that a revisionist history of the
Supreme Court turned out to be a more daunting project than I anticipated. I hope though that this very sketchy outline does illuminate some
aspects of the Supreme Court's decisions that the Progressive synthesis
overlooks.
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